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A Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, with
Implications for Labor Law
Keith N. Hylton*
I.

Introduction

This Paper deals with a topic at the core of labor, property, and
contract law: to what extent should individuals be free to enter into
agreements of their choice? In many instances, the state intervenes to tell

parties that they may not execute or enforce certain agreements, or that
they must incorporate certain "minimum terms." A broad view of property rights would support the position that individuals are free to enter into

whatever agreements suit them. A narrow view, on the other hand, is
consistent with the claim that the state may require contracting parties to

comply with a set of minimum terms.
This Paper aims to provide a theory of minimum terms in the employment context. I first examine the tension between minimum terms and the
employment-at-will doctrine.' I argue that the common intuitive notion
that the at-will rule is inconsistent with minimum terms is false, and sketch

a theory of common-law minimum terms. I then consider "new labor law
minimum terms," the most important of which is the right under section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act to form and to join labor unions.2
I am more concerned with providing a theoretical foundation for
section 7 rights. In spite of the legal significance of the New Deal labor

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B. 1982, Harvard; Ph.D. 1986,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. 1989, Harvard Law School.
I. The employment-at-will doctrine provides that when the term of the employment contract is indefinite, the employer and the employee are free to terminate the contract without liability at any time.
For a discussion of the rule and the controversy surrounding it, see Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding
Myths: An Empiricaland Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REv.
679, 683-96 (1994).
2. Section 7 provides as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).

1741

1742

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 74:1741

legislation, there is surprisingly little in the way of rigorous justification for
it.3 One typically finds references to coercion in the early attempts to
justify protection of organizational rights, particularly in passages
discussing the yellow dog contract.4 However, the precise sense in which
a yellow dog agreement is coercive has never been made clear. 5 The
argument that a yellow dog contract is a derivative of slavery is difficult

3. For articles discussing the social desirability of unions, see, for example, Kim B. Clark, The
Impact of Unionization on Productivity:A Case Study, 33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 451, 458-61
(1980) (presenting empirical evidence to suggest thatunions enhance productivity); Richard B. Freeman
& James L. Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PUB. INTEREST 69, 73-74 (1979) (presenting a
defense of unions as solutions to collective action problems in the workplace); Henry C. Simons, Some
Reflections on Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON. 1, 9 (1944) (treating unions as monopolistic cartels that
lead to the misallocation of resources). For articles discussing the social desirability of certain labor
law doctrines, see, for example, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A BargainingAnalysis of American Labor
Law andthe SearchforBargainingEquity and IndustrialPeace, 91 MiCH. L. REv. 419, 468-78 (1992)
(critiquing the traditional monopoly model of unions from an economic perspective); Keith N. Hylton,
Efficiency and Labor Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 471, 508-20 (1993) (arguing that labor law doctrines
reflected in successorship, partial closing, and relocation law might be understood on efficiency
grounds); Keith N. Hylton & Maria O'Brien Hylton, RentAppropriationand the LaborLaw Doctrine
of Successorship, 70 B.U. L. REv. 821, 822-23 (1990) (offering an economic justification for the successorship doctrine based on a model of unions as rent-protecting organizations); Douglas L. Leslie,
PrinciplesofLaborAntitrust, 66 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1185-92 (1980) (examining the economics of labor
unions in the context of a union's tactical objectives, such as monopolizing the labor supply and
attacking the competitors of unionized firms); Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargainingand the Coase
Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 245,286-87 (1987) (discussing the implications of applying the "mimic
the market" approach when transaction costs prevent labor and management from reaching an efficient
collective bargaining agreement); Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics
of Collective Bargaining:An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting,Partial
Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1352-53 (1988) (arguing that "significant elements
of labor law can be viewed as attempting to remedy market failures in internal labor markets").
My point here is rather narrow. The novel feature of the New Deal legislation was the prohibition of yellow dog and other agreements restricting employee organizational rights. "Yellow dog
contract" refers to an agreement in which an employee promises, as a condition of employment, never
to join a union while remaining with his present employer. The term also refers to "agreements not
to go on strike, or not to do anything which will interfere with the employer's conduct of a non-union
or open shop." Edwin E. Witte, "Yellow Dog" Contracts, 6 Wis. L. REv. 21, 21 (1930). Unions
existed long before the New Deal. Why organizational rights should be protected by legislation outlawing agreements inconsistent with those rights has not been addressed in the literature on the social
desirability of unions or labor law.
4. In discussing the limitations upon an abstract right to contract, Frankfurter and Greene provided
the classic description, observing that
[tihe legal conception of "duress" at common law is much narrower than the range of
economic coercion. But that conception of duress grew out of a very different state of
society ....
The compulsions upon men's free choice in action vary from time to time,
and living law must make its accommodations to shifts in compulsion. Certainly, if a
legislature, having due regard to... the inequitable provisions of [yellow dog] contracts,
should conclude that a wise public policy does not justify their judicial enforcement, the
Supreme Court ought not to neglect the truth of such industrial facts ....
FELix FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 214 (1930).
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Comnon LawforLaborRelations:A Critiqueof the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1370-75 (1983) (refuting the economic duress argument as a
justification for abolishing yellow dog contracts).
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to accept; for if such a pledge strips a worker of fundamental rights, why

is this not also true of a promise not to reveal trade secrets or not to sell
one's services to a competing employer?6
Although I find it hard to justify a legislative prohibition of the yellow
dog agreement, the theory I present does reveal in a precise sense how
such a contract might be coercive. I show that under some fairly routine

conditions, the anti-union promise may be procured by the employer at a
price that fails to compensate employees for the rights traded away. This

failure is the result of a sort of "strategic coercion" that is a fixed feature
of the bargaining setting. It is possible, to be sure, for employees to adopt

strategies that would enable them to avoid or lessen the potential for
strategic coercion, but there is no guarantee that employees will do so. In

light of this, fundamental section 7 protections may be justified on coercion
grounds, but this is a kind of coercion that has nothing to do with

traditional notions of duress.
I use the theory of strategic coercion to provide a positive theory of
the fundamental labor law decisions on the scope of section 7 rights. I find
that there is a common thread explaining several key and seemingly
unrelated decisions, such as Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,7 J. L Case
Co. v. NLRB, and NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg Warner.9 That

6. Public sector employers, unlike their private sector counterparts, cannot force employees to give
up their associational rights. The problem is that all contracts restrain the freedom of the contracting
party. If an anti-union promise is a form of slavery because it restrains employees from exercising
"basic" freedoms, then what principle restricts the set of basic freedoms? Because this question cannot
be answered, I will not rely on a theory of inherent rights to provide a rationale for the prohibition of
yellow dog contracts.
I will also not rely on paternalistic arguments. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributiveand
PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
UnequalBargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 563 (1982) (asserting that "paternalist motives play
a central role in explaining the rules of the contract and tort systems with respect to agreements" and
denying that "paternalist intervention can bejustified only by the 'incapacity' of the person the decision
maker is trying to protect"); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763, 765 (1983) (describing three different forms of paternalistic restriction in contract law, one
form justified by economic efficiency and distributive considerations, another by the idea of personal
integrity, and the third by "the familiar, though poorly understood, notion of sound judgment"). The
sophisticated economic version of paternalism relies on a theory of "time-inconsistent preferences."
See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 84 (1979)
(arguing that paternalistic laws are unobjectionable to the extent that they stem from citizens' desire to
protect themselves against their own impulsive behavior in the future); Robert H. Strotz, Myopia and
Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 171, 168-72 (1956) (introducing a microeconomio model to demonstrate that an individual's optimal consumption plan may
change over time and commenting that "there is nothing patently irrational about the individual who
finds that he is in an intertemporal tussle with himself-except that rational behavior requires that he
take the prospect of such a tussle into account"). Paternalism, however, offers no limit to the amount
of state intervention that the theory supports.
7. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
8. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
9. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).

1744

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 74:1741

common thread is simple: section 7 doctrine aims to prevent inequitable
transfers of organizational rights that may result from the strategic
incentives of employees. Put another way, section 7 shields employees
from strategically coercive transfers of organizational rights.
This theory of section 7 reconciles Republic Aviation with the rule of
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox ° and, more recently, Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB. 1" Republic Aviation holds that broad rules prohibiting solicitation
of union support at the workplace generally violate the NLRA."2 The
decision can be understood as preventing employees from trading away
their right to engage in such solicitation. In Lechmere, the Supreme Court
asserted a broad right on the part of the employer to prohibit nonemployee
organizers from soliciting support or distributing information on company
property.'3
Commentators have argued that the Babcock &
llcox/Lechmere doctrine is inconsistent with the theory of section 7.14
But it is one thing to prohibit potentially coercive transfers of rights and
quite another to reassign property rights. The rules of Republic Aviation
and Lechmere are consistent with the theory that section 7 aims to prohibit
strategically coercive transfers without reassigning property rights.
Although my focus is labor law, this Paper has implications for
contract theory as well. It is a commonplace axiom now that even though
parties bargain in order to enhance their wealth, the resulting contracts may
fail to maximize the wealth of the parties. 5 Two reasons for this failure
have received a great deal of attention in the literature. One is that the
costs of bargaining make it economically irrational for the parties to

10. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
11. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
12. Specifically, the Court relied on § 8(a)(1) of the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994). For
the exceptions to the general rule, see infra text accompanying notes 105-111.
13. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 538.
14. For recent critiques, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After
Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994) (arguing Lechmere's interpretation of the right to exclude is
overly broad and not justified by the NLRA or state property law); Robert A. Gorman, Union Access
to Private Property:A CriticalAssessment of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 10-

11, 10-21 (1991) (chastising the Lechmere decision for, among other things, "trivializ[ing] the core
§ 7 right of workers to learn about the merits of a union"). On the apparent inconsistency between
property and § 7 rights, see William B. Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property,
18 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1964) and William B. Gould, Union OrganizationalRights and the Concept of

'Quasi-Public" Property, 49 MINN. L. REV. 505 (1965).
15. The general theory is that contractual failure may result because of "transaction costs." See

R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (observing that such operations
as finding a transaction partner and negotiating the terms of a deal may be "sufficiently costly... to
prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked
without cost"). Coase's paper is generally cited for introducing the Coase Theorem, which states,
roughly, that in the absence of transaction costs, parties will reach agreements that maximize wealth.
But if the costs of transacting are high, the parties may not have incentives to enter into wealthenhancing contracts.

1996]

1745

Minimum Contract Terms

include provisions covering remote contingencies.

16

The other is that

informational asymmetries may lead parties to avoid making certain
proposals for strategic reasons. 17 This Paper illustrates a third process
that generates wealth-reducing contracts: strategic incentives that arise

when one of the bargaining parties is a group, such as a group of
employees. Bargaining costs and informational asymmetry play no role in
this analysis.
This Paper is organized as follows.

Part II presents a catalogue of

different types of minimum terms with some discussion of their economic
implications. Part III examines the tension between minimum terms and
the employment-at-will rule. The tension exists only on a superficial level.
The at-will rule existed simultaneously with a rich set of common-law
minimum terms. In Part IV, I provide a theory of new labor law minimum
terms, with special emphasis on the right to form unions. In Part V, I use
the theory developed in Part IV to explain a number of fundamental labor

law doctrines.
II. Minimum Terms: Definitions, Types
The standard example of a minimum term in an employment contract
is a minimum wage law, such as the minimum of $4.25 per hour required
by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 8 But what about section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits anti-

16. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 35-55 (2d ed. 1987) (relying on bargaining costs to explain basic features of contract law); Coase, supra note 15; Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, The MitigationPrinciple:Toward a GeneralTheory of ContractualObligation, 69 VA.
L. REV. 967, 972 (1983) (observing that parties are not likely to "work out definitively the optimal responses to all future contingencies").
In addition to explaining the degree of detail observed in a typical contract, the bargaining cost
theory suggests that parties will sometimes fail to make a contract, and in other cases bargaining costs
will explain the nature of the contract. Bargaining costs play an important role in Coase's theory of
the firm. See Ronald H. Coase, The Natureofthe Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (positing that firms
integrate vertically because the costs of contracting make a system of specific, spot-market transactions
infeasible).
17. This idea is implicit in Coase's theory of transaction costs and bargaining. See Coase, supra
note 15, at 15. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
1987, at 113, 115 (concluding that "we cannot assume that all mutually beneficial contracts are signed,
unless we assume that everyone knows everything about everyone, which they do not"). A number
of recent articles, however, have further articulated this argument. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertoer, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989) (recommending that default rules for filling gaps in incomplete contracts be based on the
concept of "penalty default"-terms which parties would not want-to encourage the parties to reveal
information); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contractsand Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432, 434-35
(1992) (presenting a principal-agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual
incompleteness).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
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Is this also a minimum term, and if so, how does

it differ from the minimum wage?
The prohibition of anti-union agreements and the minimum wage stat-

ute are alike in that they both prohibit certain types of agreements, or limit
the set of agreements into which parties may enter. The minimum wage

prohibits agreements in which the employer promises to pay-and the
employee accepts-a wage less than the statutory minimum.

Section

8(a)(3) prohibits agreements in which the employee promises never to join
a union while working for the employer. Thus, "minimum term" will be
used in this Paper to refer to restraints on the set of contracts which the
parties may execute and enforce.
Minimum terms may be grouped into three classes: contractual,
statutory, and common law. "Contractual" refers to the set of terms

determined by agreement, such as an agreement between a union and an
employer to maintain the hourly wage above ten dollars over the term of
their agreement. By "statutory," I mean those minimum terms imposed by
statute, such as the minimum wage required by the FLSA. Finally, by
"common law" I mean those minimum terms imposed by judge-made law.

A common-law rule requiring courts to read ambiguous employment contracts in a manner that favors employees could, under certain conditions,
be equivalent to a statutory minimum term.
Of the three classes, contractual minimum terms are the least worrisome in terms of their effects on the welfare of the parties.'
If the

parties are well-informed and conditions suggesting a voluntary exchange
are present, the parties will agree to a contractual minimum term when and

only when it enhances welfare for both sides.2

19. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA provides that "[ilt
shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1994). This section is generally understood to declare that anti-union agreements are
unfair labor practices. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1954).
20. By "welfare" here and throughout the text, I refer to the net benefits each party gains through
contracting. Thus, if the employer is willing to pay $50 for an hour of the worker's time, and actually
pays $20, the employer's net benefit (or welfare) from the employment contract is $30. If the employee is willing to work for the employer for as little as $10 per hour, the employee's net benefit from
the employment contract is $10. The total welfare is then $10 + $30 = $40. Welfare is equivalent
in this usage to the concept of "consumer surplus." See JACK HiRsHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPuCATIONS 204-06 (4th ed. 1988) (explaining consumer surplus as the net advantage to consumers
of buying at the equilibrium price even though they would have been willing to pay a higher price).
While the consumer surplus approach has been criticized for not capturing income effects, those effects
are likely to be small. See Robert D. Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON.
REV. 589, 589 (1976) (providing empirical data to demonstrate the validity of consumer surplus as a
measure of welfare).
21. This is an implication of the Coase Theorem. See Coase, supra note 15, at 15 (arguing that
parties to a transaction will exhaust all opportunities for a mutually advantageous exchange if
transaction costs are zero).

1996]

Minimum Contract Terms

1747

Consider, for example, a work-preservation clause in a collective

bargaining agreement. The clause guarantees some measure of job security
to employees, and thus is as valuable to employees as a wage enhancement.

To the extent that it constrains the employer from subcontracting out work
in order to reduce costs, however, the clause makes production more
costly.

Suppose the work preservation clause is worth $500 to the

employees (i.e., they are willing to offer a concession worth $500 in
exchange for it) and the expected cost of the clause to the employer is
$400. The parties then have an incentive to agree to the clause and will be

better off as a result.
On the other extreme in terms of worrisomeness is the statutory

minimum term. The legislature may impose such a term in instances
where it fails to place both parties in a better position. Indeed, the
standard analysis of the minimum wage concludes that it fails to improve
the welfare of all the parties.' Employers who rely on low-skilled, lowwage labor are forced by such a statute to exit the industry, or to alter the

production process so that low-wage workers are not employed. Since the
22. For a survey of the literature, see Charles Brown et al., The Effect of the Minimum Wage on
Employment and Unemployment, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 487, 487 (1982). Briefly, the reason the
minimum wage fails to improve the welfare of all parties is as follows. Low-skill employees are hurt
by the minimum wage because an employer is unlikely to have an incentive to hire them, precisely
because the value of an hour of such an employee's time is likely to fall below the wage floor.
Employers who rely on low-skill employees are forced by such a statute to exit the industry; although,
if the capital used in production can be transferred to some other use, these employers can sell their
assets without incurring a substantial loss. The employees are made redundant by a minimum wage
that causes them to suffer in the short- and probably long-term.
There is recent research suggesting that the minimum wage may not have the negative employment effects typically predicted in economic analyses. See David Card, Using Regional Variationin
Wages to Measure the Effects of the FederalMinimum Wage, 46 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 6, 14-16
(1992) (demonstrating that the 1990 increase in the federal minimum wage increased teenage employment); David Card, Do Minimum Wages Reduce Employment? A Case Study of California, 1987-89,
46 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REv. 38, 38 (1992) (offering data indicating that after a 1988 increase in the
California minimum wage there was no correlative decline in employment of young and less-skilled
workers); Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Fast-Food
Industry, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 6, 15, 14-16 (1992) (demonstrating through a study of the
Texas fast-food industry that, contrary to conventional economic models, "employment growth was positively related to the size of wage increases mandated by the minimum wage"); Stephen Machin & Alan
Manning, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Wage Dispersion and Employment: Evidencefrom the
U.K. Wages Council, 47 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 319, 319 (1994) (finding either a positive effect
or no effect on employment as a result of minimum wages). But see David Neumark & William
Wascher, Employment Effects of Minimum and Subminimum Wages: Panel Data on State Minimum
Wage Laws, 46 INmuS. & LAB. REL. REV. 55, 55 (1992) (providing data in support of the argument
that increases in the minimum wage cause declining employment); Nicholas Williams, RegionalEffects
of the Minimum Wage on Teenage Employment, 25 APPLIED ECON. 1517, 1526 (1993) (demonstrating
employment reductions in the teenage labor force resulting from the minimum wage). The new "prominimum wage" results, however, do not contradict the prediction that low-skilled employees are disadvantaged in the labor market as a result of such legislation. For a review of the recent debate among
empirical economists, see Louis Uchitelle, A Pay Raise's Impact: A HigherMinimum Wage Does Not
Lead to Big Losses in Jobs, Research Indicates, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 1995, at DI, D19.

1748

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 74:1741

latter option is available to the parties even in the absence of the statute,

it is unlikely the statute makes them better off, for the parties would have
had incentives to adopt that alternative well before the passage of the

statute.13
Common-law minimum terms fall somewhere in between the statutory

and contractual categories in terms of their implications for the welfare of
the contracting parties. When the common-law minimum term acts as a
default rule that mimics what the parties would have chosen on their own,
then it saves transaction costs and enhances the parties' welfare.' Thus,

23. Obviously, there are reasons that parties might not adopt welfare-enhancing changes. The
Coase Theorem implies that if the costs of bargaining over such a modification are very high, the modification will not be adopted. See Coase, supra note 15, at 15. In some cases, a certain welfare-enhancing change may be simple, yet require a high degree of inventiveness to see it. See Daniel A.
Farber, The Case Against Brilliance,70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 919-20 (1986) (arguing that although an
economic theory may be brilliant, it may nevertheless fail to impact individual lives because most
people are not brilliant enough to see it). In other cases, a party may be reluctant to propose a welfareenhancing modification because the proposal itself may signal the existence of some undesirable trait
or tendency in the proposer. See Spier, supranote 17, at 433 (providing the example ofa professional
athlete unwilling to ask for an injury clause in his contract for fear that the team manager will believe
he is more likely to be injured than another player). Neither of these arguments seems to apply very
well, however, to the setting where both employer and employees are made better off by an increase
in the proportion of highly paid employees.
I have not exhausted all of the reasons that a statutory minimum term may be undesirable. The
statutory minimum term is also worrisome in its welfare effects because it reduces competition in the
labor market in a manner that benefits high-skilled employees. The reduction in competition leads to
an increase in production costs, and thus an increase in prices, which works to impoverish all consumers. In addition, the process gives the highly skilled an incentive to seek further restrictions in order
to maintain their positions, and generates a provider-client relationship between high-skilled workers
and their legislative advocates. Thus, statutory minimum terms tend to generate "rent-seeking" legislative action. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (explaining how industries and occupations with significant political power seek
state regulations in an attempt to control entry into the industry or occupation).
24. When the parties are fully informed and the direct costs of bargaining pose the only obstacle
to making a contract that covers all of the possible contingencies, then a default rule that reflects the
bargain they would have reached if the bargaining costs had been zero enhances welfare by providing
a clear rule at no cost to the parties. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 4 (1979) (positing that one of the functions of background rules of
law is "to reduce the costs of the exchange process by supplying a standard set of risk-allocation terms
for use by contracting parties").
What happens when the parties are not fully inf9rmed? Suppose one of the parties has an informational advantage? In this case, the "reasonable" rule is likely to be one that constrains the informationally advantaged party's power to exploit his advantage. A rule that gives the advantaged party an
incentive to disclose information would be appropriate. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 17, at 98100; Farrell, supra note 17, at 117-20.
Would a rule that encourages information disclosure be one that mimics what the parties would
have chosen, or would it be one that they would not have chosen? The answer depends on your perspective. If both parties were told to choose a rule without knowing which one of them would have
the advantage, they would choose the one that encourages disclosure. Expost, however, when the advantaged party knows that he has an advantage, he would clearly choose a rule that maximizes his advantage. When I say that an appropriate default rule reflects what the parties would have chosen on
their own, I refer to the case where they are not aware of their advantages.
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to the extent common-law minimum terms reflect implicit terms that typically govern private agreements, they are welfare-enhancing.

A second set of distinctions among minimum terms concerns the scope
of the restriction on private agreements. Some statutory or common-law
minimum terms prohibit certain agreements while others merely deny
parties the option of having their agreement judicially enforced. For
example, section 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits federal courts

from enforcing anti-union agreements.'

Section 8(a)(3) of the National

Labor Relations Act is understood as making anti-union agreements

unlawful.
I include both prohibitions of agreements and restrictions on enforce-

ability under the heading "minimum term." Although a restriction on
enforceability places fewer constraints on the parties than does the
prohibition of a certain type of agreement, it still has a big impact on the
parties' ability to design a contract of their choice. If one party breaches
a promise that is unenforceable, the other cannot collect damages for the
injury that results. Realizing this, the party who is likely to be injured has

an incentive to alter the terms of the contract in a manner that offsets the
risk of breach; and if the expected injury from breach is sufficiently high,
the prospective victim will not have an incentive to enter into the contract

at all. So, a restriction on enforceability can have an impact as significant
as a prohibition on the type of agreement.
III. Minimum Terms and the Common Law
Coppage v. Kansas' contains an apparently logical argument,
elevated to the level of constitutional doctrine, to the effect that minimum
terms are inconsistent with the employment-at-will doctrine.'
The

argument runs as follows: because the employer may lawfully fire an
employee for any reason whatsoever in an at-will regime, it should be
Note that I am rejecting the dichotomy between ordinary and penalty defaults proposed in Ayres
& Gertner, supra note 17, at 87-95. I reject their dichotomy because it carries the implication that informational asymmetry requires something more than the transaction cost analysis originally suggested
by Coase. The problem of informational asymmetry, however, has been recognized from the very start
as a source of transaction costs in Coase's framework. See Farrell, supra note 17, at 115 ("[W]hen
people don't know one another's tastes or opportunities, then experience, theory and experimental
evidence all confirm that negotiations may be protracted, costly and unsuccessful.").
25. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
26. See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42 (1954) (explaining that the clear
purpose of § 8(a)(3) is to prevent an employerfrom encouraging or discouraging the union membership
of its employees by discriminatory means).
27. 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruledby NLRB v. Jones& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
28. Id. at 13 ("Under constitutional freedom of contract, whatever either party has the right to treat
as sufficient ground for terminating the employment, where there is no itipulation on the subject, he
has the right to provide against by insisting that a stipulation respecting it shall be a sine qua non of
the inception of the employment, or of its continuance if it be terminable at will.").
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within an employer's rights to condition employment on any requirement.

The argument is persuasive, on a superficial level, because it boils down
to a claim that a certain greater power includes a lesser power. 29
A.

Fundamental Common-Law Minimum Terms

Though persuasive at first glance, the greater-includes-lesser power
doctrine is unreliable as a theory of common-law rules. There were

fundamental common-law minimum terms that restricted (and, where
applicable, continue to restrict) the set of enforceable agreements.
Blackstone's discussions of the employment relationship" and of

fundamental common-law rights (personal security, liberty, and
property)3 suggest the existence of such terms. The best known term is

the prohibition of a contract for total slavery. Such an agreement would
not be enforced because "[e]very sale implies a price, a quidpro quo, but

what equivalent can be given for life, and liberty, an equivalent given to
the seller in lieu of what he transfers to the buyer: both of which (in
absolute slavery) are held to be in the master's disposal?"32
Similarly, the fundamental right of personal security, which includes
protection of bodily integrity and autonomy, seems to have provided
minimum terms in the employment contract. On this right, Blackstone
asserted that
the life and limbs of a man are of such high value, in the estimation
of the law of England, that it pardons even homicide if committed se

29. One ancient form of the greater-includes-lesser power doctrine attempts to provide ajustification for the enslavement of prisoners of war. In this context the attempted justification runs as follows:
if it is morally unobjectionable for the victors to kill the opposing forces, then it is surely not morally
objectionable for the victors to merely enslave them. As Blackstone noted in his brief discussion of
justifications offered in defense of slavery, this argument relies on the false premise that war provides
a moral basis for killing one's enemy, whether he resists or not. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *411.
In the property context, the greater-includes-lesser power doctrine generates the argument that
because an owner can exclude another from his property for any reason, good or bad, he can condition
entry on any requirement that pleases him. As testimony to the persuasiveness of this argument, note
that Holmes adhered to it throughout his career and applied it in a number of cases. See, e.g., Motion
Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("Generally speaking, the measure of a condition is the consequence of a breach, and if that
consequence is one that the owner may impose unconditionally, he may impose it conditionally upon
a certain event."); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 18 (1990) ("The
second example is Holmes's rejection of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions: he thought that
since a person has no right to be a police officer (or any other type of public employee), an officer cannot complain if the police department has a rule denying its employees free speech. The greater
power-the power not to hire-includes the lesser power to condition employment on the employee's
agreeing to surrender his constitutional rights.").
30. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410-20.
31. Id. at* 125-36.
32. Id. at *412.
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defendendo, or in order to preserve them. For whatever is done by
a man, to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon
the highest necessity and compulsion. Therefore if a man through
fear of death or mayhem is prevailed upon to execute a deed, or do
any other legal act; these, though accompanied with all other
requisite solemnities, are totally void in law, if forced upon him by
a well-grounded apprehension of losing his life, or even his limbs,
in case of his non-compliance. And the same is also a sufficient
excuse for the commission of many misdemeanors .... 1
And in a later passage we learn that "[t]he statute law of England does
therefore very seldom, and the common law does never, inflict any
punishment extending to life or limb, unless upon the highest necessity."34
However, the part that comes closest to the question at hand is a
discussion of the limits of the duress excuse:
A fear of battery or being beaten, though never so well grounded, is
no duress; neither is the fear of having one's house burnt, or one's
goods taken away and destroyed; because in these cases, should the
threat be performed, a man may have satisfaction by recovering
equivalent damages: but no suitable atonement can be made for the
loss of life, or limb.35
While none of these passages deals squarely with the case in which an
employer conditions employment on the surrender of claims to bodily
integrity, they clearly suggest such a condition would not have been
enforced.
Personal liberty, the second fundamental right, receives similar
treatment in Blackstone. 36 A related source of fundamental minimum
terms stems from the right to apply to courts for redress of injuries,37 so
it follows that an employer could not enforce a condition requiring the
employee to forfeit all legal claims.
B.

Minimum Terms, Employment at Will, and FundamentalRights

The simultaneous existence of minimum terms and the at-will rule
forces us to ask whether there are deeper sources for these seemingly
inconsistent doctrines. The difficulty in squaring employment at will with
the existence of common-law minimum terms is not merely the result of a
clash between two opposing doctrines. It illustrates one of many points of

33. Id. at *126.

34. Id. at *129.
35. Id. at *127.
36. See id. at *130-34.

37. See id. at "137.
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conflict among fundamental common-law rights." The at-will doctrine
recognizes the employer's ownership of a job slot as a form of private
property: just as the owner of a parcel of land could exclude others from
that parcel for any reason whatsoever, so too could an employer exclude
a worker from a job slot.39

The right to exclude, under common-law trespass doctrine, has traditionally been broad in scope.

In Gilbert v. Stone4' the defendant was

found guilty of trespass" even though he fled in "fear of his life." 41 Thus,
a knowing, intelligent decision to invade the property of another was, at
least at one time, sufficient to support a trespass claim, even though the
crossing was spurred by a well-grounded fear of bodily harm.4' On the
other hand, it has never been trespass where the invasion itself is not
voluntary, as in the case of a person thrown off of his horse onto the land
of another. The region of legal uncertainty has involved intentional

invasions that might also be said to be involuntary, such as the famous
squib case, Scott v. Shepherd,43 where the court rejected the argument that
each individual who threw the squib in order to escape the blast was guilty

of an independent trespass. 4 The reasoning was not made clear, but the
majority probably felt that the intermediate squib handlers were motivated
by an involuntary desire to preserve themselves.

38. These fundamental rights (personal security, liberty, and property) can be thought of as large
(tectonic) plates under the surface of legal doctrine. Difficult legal conflicts arise (like earthquakes)
where these plates meet and occasionally rub together. Because the law is most uncertain at these
points of friction, one should expect a large number of litigated disputes in these areas, and also expect
their outcomes to be most uncertain. For the argument that legal uncertainty is greatest at the point
of conflict between two established legal doctrines, see OLIvER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 101
(Little, Brown & Co. reprint) (Mark D. Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1st ed. 1881).
39. But seeEstlund, supranote 14, at 336-39 (arguing that recent decisions recognizing expansions
in the doctrine of private necessity render invalid the doctrine that a property owner can exclude for
any reason, good or bad). Although Estiund's argument is fairly persuasive, I think it is fair to say
that trespass doctrine has not been replaced by a general balancing test that seeks to determine whether
the intrusion onto another's property was "reasonable" (perhaps because the benefits outweighed the
costs).
40. 82 Eng. Rep. 539 (K.B. 1647).
41. Id.
42. The law today is not as harsh as the rule suggested by Gilbert v. Stone. The general question
is the extent to which necessity will provide a privilege to intrude on another's land. The leading case
on this is Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (holding a ship owner liable
for dock damage caused by his vessel during a storm, even though prudent seamanship required the
ship's master to leave the ship moored to the dock). The privilege is narrow: the actor will not be
liable for the entry itself, but will be liable for any actual harm caused by the intrusion. See FOWLER
V. HARPER Er AL., I THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.22, at 85-87 (3d ed. 1996).
43. 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773). A brief description of the case is this: Shepherd throws a big
firecracker into a market in which several sellers are working at their stalls. The first to grab the firecracker (Willis) throws it and it lands near another stall, where another seller (Ryal) grabs it and
throws it and it explodes, putting out the eye of Scott.
44. HOLMES, supra note 38, at 104.
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If one extends the reasoning of these cases to the employment context,
the conclusion emerges that the employer's right to fire an employee in an
at-will regime is quite broad and could be exercised without fear of legal
repercussion, even when the termination foreseeably results in a large loss
to the employee. A property rights theory of employment at will therefore
yields the prediction that an employer who foresees that termination would
lead to the employee's eviction from his apartment would not be held
responsible for the injury.4' The employee who refused to leave the
employer's premises (after the license to remain had been revoked) would
be guilty of trespass, unless the premises were a ship out at sea, and
survival required the employee to remain.
If I am right in suggesting that the employment-at-will doctrine is an
application of established tort and property law doctrines to the employment context, then it follows that the clash between the at-will rule and
common-law minimum terms is in part a clash among competing fundamental common-law rights. Further, the argument provides a simple
explanation for the conflict between minimum terms and the at-will rule,
which has long been a source of controversy.
That one can exclude another from one's property because that person
refuses to waive all claims to bodily integrity and yet cannot enforce a
contract in which entrance is conditioned on such a waiver illustrates a
conflict between rights of property and of personal security. Although it
seems a little odd that a property owner can exclude a person on any basis
and yet cannot enforce every conceivable condition on entry, this is
probably the only simple solution that would not require a substantial
diminution in either property or personal security rights. For if an owner
could enforce any agreement, then courts could be used to aid private
efforts to strip others of personal security. On the other hand, if an
owner's right to exclude were limited by the liberty rights of others, the
right to exclude would be virtually worthless.
An example may be useful. Suppose the Tasmanian Devil (Taz) wants
to work on property owned by Bugs Bunny (Bugs). Bugs knows that Taz
causes enormous damage wherever he goes. Bugs is willing to have Taz
work on his land as long as Taz is willing to confine himself to a cage.
We have a conflict between Bugs's right to exclude and Taz's liberty. If
Bugs's property right consistently trumped Taz's liberty, then if Taz were
to leave his cage, he would become a trespasser because he would have
exceeded the scope of Bugs's invitation.'
If Taz's right trumps, Taz
45. For a fairly recent discussion of the at-will rule consistent with this view, see Redick v. Kraft,
Inc., 745 F. Supp. 296, 303-04 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
46. Bugs could bring a trespass claim, use certain self-help measures to exclude Taz, and, given
the assumption that Bugs's rights are more important, seek an injunction (requiring Taz to either stay
off the property or to remain in the cage while on the property). On self-help, note that if Taz were
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could sue on the ground that he could not lawfully be excluded because of

his refusal to stay in a cage.
Under the common-law solution, Bugs cannot enforce the condition,
nor does he have an action for trespass; and the law does not permit Taz
to sue for damages on the ground that he was excluded unlawfully.

Because liberty is regarded as a fundamental right, a promise to surrender
that right cannot be enforced.4 7

Similarly, Taz cannot sue Bugs for

damages because Bugs's right to exclude is not conditioned on the rights
of others. The parties are both restricted to self-help measures: Taz can
leave the property rather than comply with the condition, and Bugs can
remove Taz if he refuses to comply.

Of the solutions considered, the common-law solution is the only one
realistically capable of resolving the dispute between Bugs and Taz while
preserving the rights of each. If Taz's liberty were given priority, Bugs's
property right would be limited in precisely those instances in which he has
the greatest desire to assert it. And if we admit the possibility that courts

make mistakes,' a system in which Taz's right is given priority would
generate a flurry of complaints from people who would claim to have been
excluded because they refused to give up their liberty. Similarly, Taz's

liberty would not be worth much in a regime in which Bugs could enlist
the power of an occasionally erroneous or biased state in enforcing an
alleged agreement to surrender it.
C. The General Bases for Common-Law Minimum Terms
Fundamental common-law rights provide one set of minimum terms
in employment contracts, but any attempt to provide a theory of commonlaw minimum terms will have to look toward other sources as well. The
other broad common-law basis for finding a minimum term in a contract

violently destroying Bugs's property, Bugs could use force to get Taz off his property. Deadly force,
however, would not be permitted unless Taz assaulted Bugs. See, e.g., M'Ilvoy v. Cockran, 9 Ky.
(2 A.K. Marsh.) 271, 276 (1820) (finding that personal assault would justify a "wounding," while
defense of possession would not); W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 21, at 132-33 (5th ed. 1984) ("[T]here is no privilege to use any force calculated to cause
death or serious bodily injury to repel the threat to land or chattels, unless there is also such a threat
to the defendant's personal safety." (footnotes omitted)).
47. However, Bugs can bring an action based on some extra-contractual theory, such as negligence. Moreover, Taz enjoys something equivalent to a privilege for the pure invasion. If Taz did
unnecessary damage to Bugs's land in the course of leaving it,
then he would remain liable for actual
damage, as suggested by the necessity cases. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221
(Minn. 1910) (holding the owner of a cargo ship liable for the actual damages sustained by a dock to
which the ship was moored when the ship, in the course of a severe storm, repeatedly struck against
the dock, even though prudence required the captain to refrain from setting sail).
48. The Court might make a mistake such as finding that Bugs unlawfully excluded Taz when in
fact he did not. On the incentive effects of courtroom error, see Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation
and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 433, 446-50 (1990).
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is public policy.49 Restraints on alienation and restraints of trade make
up two large public policy exceptions to the general rule that a promise is
enforceable.
In the employment context, restraint-of-trade doctrine has provided an
important source of minimum contract terms. Mitchel v. Reynolds0 stated
the "rule of reason" that applies in trade restraint cases: general
agreements, not limited in time or space, are presumptively unenforceable;
while agreements that are particular and, consequently, limited in time or
space, may be enforced."1 Thus, an employer who conditioned employment on the employee's agreement never to work in the same line of trade
anywhere in the world for the rest of his life, after leaving the employer's
shop, could not count on such an agreement being judicially enforced.5 2
Such agreements smack of slavery, in the employment context, but courts
have held them unenforceable because they restrain trade, creating monopoly power.53 Put another way, courts refused to enforce the agreements
because of the third party, or external, costs of monopolization.
Although the list of common-law minimum terms provided here is not
exhaustive-for example, it should include the right to vote-we have come
far enough to state general theoretical sources of common-law minimum
terms. Restraint-of-trade doctrine is concerned with the external harms
generated by certain agreements.
The "fundamental" common-law
minimum terms (i.e., those connected to fundamental rights) are based
either on the theory that each agreement must exhibit some sort of mutuality or consideration," or on the notion that special protection should be
provided to aspects of bodily integrity and personal autonomy because there
are no generally accepted substitutes to these entitlements, and they are
incommensurable with money.55 The mutuality theory is implicit in
Blackstone's argument against the enforceability of a contract for slavery.
Blackstone suggests the incommensurability theory in his description of the
duress doctrine.

49. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS 893-94 (3d

ed. 1987) (discussing the ability to enforce otherwise illegal bargains by means of severance or by a
process of interpretation and reformation).
50. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711).
51. Id. at 349.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. That is, the contract cannot be so one-sided that it is difficult to believe that a rational individual would accept it. As Blackstone noted, a contract for total slavery is the classic example of a violation of the mutuality principle. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *411-12.
55. This theory is also the source of "inalienability rules" identified by Calabresi and Melamed.
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One

View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-15 (1972) (positing that moralisms-external
costs that cannot be objectively measured, and paternalism, which is the judgment that an individual
cannot always make the best choices for himself, result in inalienability rules).
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I will label the three sources: (1) externality, (2) mutuality, and (3)
incommensurability. As suggested, each of the three sources includes or
implies several minimum terms as special cases or applications. For
example, under the externality theory, which recognizes that certain
contracts may be desirable as between two parties but undesirable from a
social standpoint,5 6 we see as special cases the common law of trade
restraints, restraints on alienation, and more generally the refusal of courts
to enforce agreements to commit a crime. Moreover, under the mutuality
theory we see as special cases the doctrine of consideration and the various
rules connected to it.'
It would take us too far beyond the scope of this Paper to explore
these areas in more detail. What I have said so far, however, should be
sufficient to serve as a sketch of the theoretical sources of limitations on
the employment-at-will doctrine. The at-will rule, before legislative
incursions, existed alongside a complex and large set of minimum terms
imposed by common law. These minimum terms were not merely imposed
in ad hoc fashion, but either resulted from conflicts among fundamental
rights respected by common law or were a reflection of the externality
concerns embodied in the established public policy grounds for refusing to
enforce contracts.
IV. A New Theory of Minimum Terms
I have argued that the greater-includes-lesser power theory of Coppage
8 is invalid as a general rule of contract law; the employmentv. Kansas"
at-will rule existed simultaneously with a large number of common-law
minimum terms.5 9 I now confront the more difficult problem of providing a rationale for the minimum terms imposed by federal labor law. The
most important federally prescribed minimum term is the prohibition of
yellow dog and other agreements prohibiting or restricting the right of
employees to form and to join unions.
The literature has failed so far to provide a coherent theoretical
justification for the prohibition of yellow dog contracts and, equivalently,
the legal protection extended in section 7 of the NLRA to efforts to form

56. See KR NmAN & PosNER, supra note 24, at 258 (noting that interests of third parties, if sufficiently important, may justify invalidation of a contract); Kronman, supranote 6, at 797-98 (concluding
that principles of "distributive fairness, self-respect, and the value of judgment or moral imagination"

justify paternalistic limitations on contracts).
57. See Timothy J. Mudis, OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV.
521,532-52 (1981) (arguing that opportunistic behavioris successfully deterred by the modern common
law's requirement that to uphold a contract modification there be either new consideration or some

other objectively demonstrable reason for the modification, such as unanticipated circumstances).
58. 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruledby NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

59. See supra subpart II(A).
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unions. The labor law literature on this subject is replete with conclusory
statements on the social harmfulness of the yellow dog contract, but little
analysis. For example, in their highly influential attack on the labor
injunction, Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene repeatedly asserted that
the industrial facts contradicted freedom-of-contract theories embedded in
the labor jurisprudence of the Lochner era.' But precisely how and why
the facts invalidated the theory that parties are best left to structure their
own arrangements without government interference was never explained."
Frankfurter and Greene, building on the work of Roscoe Pound,62 set a
standard for legal realist criticism that influenced several generations of

labor law scholars.'
60. I refer to the period from roughly the late 1800s to the beginning of the New Deal, in which
federal courts viewed the freedom to enter into contracts as a property right protected by the Constitution. The era is named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a decision typifying the doctrines of the period.
61. In a fairly typical passage discussing the yellow dog contract and Coppage v. Kansas,
Frankfurter and Greene asserted that
if a legislature, having due regard to the actual practice of industrial hire and fire and
specifically to the inequitable provisions of these contracts, should conclude that a wise
public policy does notjustify their judicial enforcement, the Supreme Court ought not to
neglect the truth of such industrial facts, even if this may involve a re-examination of
some assumptions in the Coppage opinion.
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 4, at 214. Assertions such as this are offered throughout the
text, as a substitute for rigorous theoretical or empirical research, which the authors presumably thought
unnecessary.
Although Frankfurter and Greene were targeting the labor injunction, their more general aim was
to provide a sustained "realist" critique of pre-Wagner Act laborjurisprudence. Perhaps the passage
that best illustrates the larger contribution of the Frankfurter and Greene analysis is the following.
Referring to the court decisions invalidating laws prohibiting yellow dog contracts, Frankfurter and
Greene explain that the legislation
ran counter to judicial conceptions of "Liberty of Contract" which the Supreme Court
discovered within "the vague contours" of the due process clause. Though actually
intervening in the push and tussle of the industrial conflict, the Court seems not to move
outside the logical framework of an abstract syllogism: freedom of contract and the right
of private property are protected by the Constitution ....
Such reasoning presupposes
a perfectly balanced symmetry of rights: the employer and employee are on an equality,
and legislation which disturbs that equality is "an arbitrary interference with the liberty
of contract .. "
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 4, at 147-48 (footnote omitted).
62. Perhaps the starting point for the legal realist critique of liberty contract doctrines is Roscoe
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1908). Pound's general argument is that the liberty-ofcontract theories adopted by the Supreme Court were inconsistent with the empirical evidence regarding
industrial relations.
63. The central plank of the realist platform is that legal doctrine is based on assumptions and
theories that often bear no relationship to reality. For an example of recent labor law analysis in the
style of Frankfurter and Greene, see JAMEs B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN
LABOR LAW 171-80 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court's labor law jurisprudence reflects values
and assumptions rooted in pre-Wagner Act law). Though never established with any degree of
scientific rigor, the claim that pre-Wagner Act labor doctrine was based on theories that were inconsistent with reality seems to be an established post-Wagner Act maxim of federal law. See, e.g.,
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 715, 715-16
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The recent writing in law and economics has also failed to provide a
theory of these rights. The more common treatment is hostile, taking as

a starting point the doctrine that freedom of contract is the best rule. It
follows from this premise that the only sound basis for refusing to enforce
a yellow dog contract is the lack of a voluntary acceptance, as when the
agreement is procured through force or fraud.' Because employees are

presumably compensated for agreeing to forfeit the right to form or to join
a union, such contracts should be permissible because they serve to
improve the welfare of both sides.' The implication of this argument is
that the minimum terms provided by federal labor law could only serve one
purpose: to redistribute wealth from employers and non-union employees

to unionized employees.'
In this Part, I present a theory of the minimum terms established by
the New Deal labor legislation, particularly those terms protecting efforts
to form and to join unions. 67 I will use several game theory examples to
examine the welfare of employees before and after they agree to an
employer's proposed contract modification. 68
Under the liberty-of-

contract doctrine, any agreement that is not procured through force or
fraud should be welfare-enhancing for all parties. I will demonstrate that

under fairly general conditions, however, voluntary employment agreements signed by fully informed parties may not be welfare-enhancing for
the employees. While I cannot prove, and do not wish to prove, that the
freedom-of-contract doctrine is always wrong, the examples do suggest that

it may not be the best rule in every setting.

(1982) ("Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunctions, one of the greatest evils
associated with them was the use of tort-law doctrines, which often made the lawfulness of a strike
depend upon judicial views of social and economic policy.").
64. E.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 1370.
65. E.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 1382 ("Any worker who accepts a yellow dog contract will
demand some compensation for giving up the possibility of the gains of union membership."). The
Coase Theorem goes further by implying that yellow dog provisions will be observed only when both
sides of the transaction gain. According to the theorem, where transaction costs are negligible, parties
will exploit all opportunities for mutually beneficial improvements in a contract. If the zero-transaction
cost conditions are satisfied in the employment setting, then yellow dog provisions will be observed
when and only when they are welfare-enhancing for the employer and the employees.
66. For a similar argument, see Daniel R. Fischel, LaborMarkets andLaborLaw Comparedwith
Capital Markets and CorporateLaw, 51 U. CHi. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1984) (arguing that because
parties already have incentives to enter into mutually advantageous contracts, the only function of a
duty to bargain must be to coerce employers to meet the demands of unions).
67. The most important statutory provisions are § 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 103
(1994), and § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.,§ 157 (1994).
68. The examples discussed in this Part are simple, and I have stressed the intuitive explanations.
In a separate set of notes I have demonstrated some of the points in this Part in a mathematical model.
See Keith N. Hylton, Coercion and Employment Contracts (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Texas Law Review) (using a mathematical model to analyze yellow dog contracts in terms of
voluntariness).
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ContractModification and Employee Wlfare

The framework I consider is one in which the employer proposes a
modification to the employment contract or collective bargaining
agreement. The modification is either one that will reduce the welfare of
all of the employees, or will reduce the welfare of a subset of employees.
I assume that the employer offers some payment in exchange for the
modification.69
To simplify matters further, I will assume that the modification is a
yellow dog agreement. However, the examples discussed below can be
generalized to apply other types of contract modification.
I will start by considering two examples in which employees have the
same preferences with respect to the yellow dog contract. The alternative
assumption is that employees differ with respect to their willingness to sign
a yellow dog agreement, which I consider later.
1. Employees Have Same Tastes.-Suppose there are three employees,
and they all hate the yellow dog contract. Specifically, each of them
assigns the value one dollar to the current contract and zero dollars to the
modified contract (i.e., the yellow dog), so their preferences are summarized as follows:

Employee 1
Employee 2
Employee 3

Status Quo
$1
$1
$1

Yellow Dog
$0
$0
$0

One's initial intuition is that the employer will have to compensate all
of the employees in order to induce them to sign the yellow dog. The level
of compensation will, one might guess, more than fully offset the losses in
employee welfare experienced by the change in the contract. Thus, if the
employees lose a total of three dollars by the contract modification, the
employer will have to raise the payroll by at least three dollars in order to
induce them to sign the agreement. This reasoning suggests that the yellow
dog provision will be accepted only under conditions in which all parties
gain in welfare, consistent with the liberty-of-contract doctrine.1 0

69. Alternatively, I could assume that the employer threatens some punishment, such as dismissal,

for refusing to accept the new contract provision. The analysis is the same under either assumption.
Seidman reports that some employers actually paid workers to sign yellow dog agreements, but those
instances seem to be relatively few. JOEL I. SEIDMAN, THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACr 69 (Johns
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science Series L, No. 4, 1932). Probably in the

vast majority of cases, workers signed out of fear that their refusal might lead to retaliation by the
employer.
70. This assumes that the employees must receive at least $1 each to sign the contract.

The

employer will presumably pay the compensation only if the value of such a provision, from the

1760

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 74:1741

Although persuasive at first glance, this reasoning is wrong because
it ignores strategic considerations. The employer can induce acceptance
without having to offer full compensation to the employees. To demonstrate this claim, and its limitations, I will work through two examples.
Example 1: Suppose acceptance of the yellow dog, for the employer's
purposes, requires unanimity. In order for the employer to induce signature by all employees, he will have to compensate each employee for the
loss in welfare caused by the yellow dog provision. Put in more formal
terms, if the employer fails to fully compensate each employee for the
welfare loss, then there will not be an equilibrium in which all employees
sign the agreement. Thus, under a unanimity requirement, the yellow dog
is accepted only when it leads to a welfare improvement for all parties.
This example shows that the liberty-of-contract doctrine-that any
agreement between parties necessarily enhances the welfare of all-is
perfectly valid when unanimity is required for acceptance of the employer's
contract modification.
Example 2: Suppose only a majority is necessary to have acceptance
of the employer's contract modification. That is, if only two employees
sign on, all three employees are, in effect, bound by the yellow dog
agreement. This is a plausible assumption in this context because it is
impossible to form a union where a majority of employees have signed and
considered themselves bound by a yellow dog contract.
Suppose the employer offers only $0.50 as compensation for signing
the agreement. This is too little to compensate employees for the loss in
welfare resulting from the contract modification. I will show that in spite
of this, however, it is possible for the employer to induce all of the
employees to sign. To state it more formally, the outcome in which all
employees sign the agreement is an equilibrium of the game under
consideration.
Consider the incentives of Employee 1. Suppose he assumes that
Employees 2 and 3 will not sign the yellow dog agreement, and hence the
agreement is not accepted. If he signs the agreement, his expected net
reward is $0.50 (the payment from the employer). If he refuses to sign the
agreement, his net reward is zero (because he assumes the contract is
rejected). Because he prefers $0.50 to zero, he will sign the agreement.
This shows that in equilibrium at least one of the employees will sign the
yellow dog agreement.
Now suppose Employees 2 and 3 have signed the agreement, and the
agreement has therefore been accepted. What is the incentive of Employee
1? By assumption, Employee l's signature will have no impact on his

employer's perspective, exceeds $3. If the employees receive $4 in compensation and the provision
is worth $5 to the employer, then both sides gain.
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valuation of the contract; it will only determine whether he gets a payment
from the employer. Clearly then, he will sign the agreement. Thus, the
outcome in which all employees sign is an equilibrium.
The only case in which the employee will demand full compensation
is when his vote is pivotal (i.e., he will determine whether the modification
is accepted or not). To see this, suppose Employee 2 has signed and
Employee 3 has refused to sign. If Employee 1 signs, his net reward is
-$0.50 (the difference between the payment of $0.50 and the $1 loss in
welfare), and if he does not sign, his net reward is zero (the yellow dog is
rejected and he gets no payment). To induce this employee's signature, the
employer will have to provide full compensation.
Thus, if an employee thinks that the yellow dog provision will not be
signed by a majority, signing the provision is a smart move: he loses
nothing and gains the side payment, even though trivial. On the other
hand, if the employee believes that the provision will be accepted by a
majority, signing the provision is, again, a smart move: it is better to get
something than nothing out of this undesirable modification. The only
employee who will not have an incentive to sign the provision (unless full
compensation is provided) is the one who thinks that his vote is pivotal.
Of course, it is the rare employee who will view his vote as pivotal.
The likely result of the contract proposal process is that all employees
sign the yellow dog even though the provision reduces employee welfare
and even though the employer's concessions fail to compensate employees
for the loss in welfare caused by the contract modification. I will refer to
this phenomenon as strategic coercion.
2. Employees Have Different Tastes.-Example 3: Suppose employee
preferences are as follows:
Status Quo Yellow Dog
Employee 1
Employee 2
Employee 3

$1
$0
$1

$0
$0.25
$0

Suppose the employer sets aside a sum of $1.50 that will be shared
among the employees who sign the yellow dog agreement. I will show that
the agreement may be signed by two employees, and therefore accepted,
even though the concessions fail to compensate for the employees' loss in
welfare.
In this case the employees' incentives can be illustrated as shown in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1

Don't Sign

Sign

($0, $0)

(-$1, $0.50)

($0.50, -$1)

(-$0.25, -$0.25)

Don't Sign

Sign

Suppose Employee 3 signs. Then his payoffs are either $0.50 or
-$0.25. The reason is as follows. Employee 2 prefers the yellow dog
contract and will sign anyway. Thus, if Employee 3 refuses to sign and
Employee 1 also refuses, the contract modification is rejected and both
Employees 1 and 3 remain in the same position in terms of welfare. If
Employee 3 signs and Employee 1 does not, then the modification is
accepted, and Employee 3 loses $1 in welfare and gains $1.50 in a side
payment, for a net of $0.50. If Employee 3 signs and Employee 1 also
signs, they both lose $1 and gain $0.75 in return as compensation, for a
net loss of $0.25 each. Suppose Employee 3 does not sign. Then his
payoffs are either $0 or -$1. To see this, suppose Employee 1 and
Employee 3 refuse to sign. Then they remain in the same position in terms
of welfare (because the modification is rejected), receiving payoffs of zero.
If Employee 3 does not sign and Employee 1 signs, then the modification
is accepted, and Employee 3 loses $1 in welfare.
In this example, the "Sign" strategy is dominant 71 in the sense that
Employee 3 is better off signing the agreement no matter what Employee
1 does. However, the net result of signing is a reduction in the welfare of
employees as a group. In this example, Employees 1 and 3 suffer a net
loss of $0.25 each, and Employee 2 gains $0.25. The net change in
position of the employees is -$0.25. Again, the liberty-of-contract doctrine
is violated.
B.

DistributionalConcerns

Distributional concerns have been ignored in the preceding examples.
Although there is no generally accepted theory of a proper income
distribution,' consideration of distributional effects may either strengthen

71. On dominance of strategies generally, see R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND
DECISIONS 79-80 (1957).
72. Such a theory would require specification of a social welfare function, as Abram Bergson and
Paul Samuelson once proposed as a method for solving resource allocation problems arising when
markets failed. See PAUL A. SAMUElSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 252-53 (1947) (ad-
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or weaken the welfare conclusions reached in the examples. Assume that

a redistribution from less wealthy to more wealthy is undesirable.

3

Consider first the case in which employees have different tastes regarding
the yellow dog. The acceptance by employees of a yellow dog provision-

where the employer does not provide concessions that compensate the
employees who suffer a loss in welfare-results in a transfer of wealth
from the employees who hate the yellow dog to those who prefer the
yellow dog. If the latter group is more well-off than the former, then the

result is undesirable on distributional grounds.
Consider the case in which all of the employees hate the yellow dog.
When the employer can induce employees to sign without fully

compensating them for the loss in welfare, a transfer of wealth from the
employees to the employer has occurred. Because the employer will
generally be the wealthier party, this is an undesirable result on
distributional grounds.

C.

General Implications

Although I have considered simple examples, a few general statements
can be extracted. One is that if the contract modification sought by the
employer must be accepted by each employee, then the freedom-of-contract
view that yellow dog contracts, and contract modifications generally, will
be observed only when they result in an enhancement of welfare for all
sides is valid. In short, where unanimity is required, the employer cannot

set up conditions that induce employees to agree to a contract modification
which results in a reduction in employee welfare.74
The unanimity requirement includes several types of contract modifications as special cases. Any contract modification that deals with

vocating a system of welfare economics where "[a] given divergence in a subset of the optimum
conditions necessitates alterations in the remaining ones"). Kenneth Arrow, however, demonstrated
in 1951 that such a welfare function could not be constructed in a manner that meets certain rationality
properties and that is also consistent with individual preferences. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 72 (1951) (concluding that it would be impossible to construct a social welfare function that satisfied stated value judgments and conditions, and that also yielded "a true
social ordering for every set of individual tastes").
73. This is consistent with a social welfare program that seeks to maximize the welfare of the least
well-off individual in society. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 100-01 (1971) (discussing the
"difference principle" of justice, which dictates that society must give more attention to those in "less
favorable social positions" in order to create equality).
74. At least employers cannot do so under the assumptions of this analysis-that there is no force
or fraud and that the parties are adequately informed. If the employees were not adequately informed,
then obviously they might agree to a contract provision that makes them worse off ex post. Of course,
if evaluated in terms of their own beliefs, ex ante, the contract provision would have made them better
off. For a rigorous demonstration of these claims in the consumer context, see Michael Spence,
ConsumerMisperceptions, ProductFailureandProducerLiability,44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 561-62
(1977).
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individual entitlements probably will satisfy the requirement. For example,
a proposal that an employee accept a reduction in pension contributions in
exchange for an increase in his wage generally deals with an individual
entitlement because that action is (ignoring tax and pension regulations) not
affected by the decisions of other employees. The yellow dog agreement
is outside of this set because acceptance, for the employer's purposes, of
a yellow dog provision is effectively achieved when fifty percent of the
employees sign. Thus, in the case of a yellow dog provision, one
employee's valuation of the provision is very much dependent on the
actions of other employees.
In the case of a yellow dog or some other provision that requires a
majority (or even a supermajority) for acceptance, the examples suggest
that it is quite likely that conditions will exist in which employees will sign
the contracts even though the concessions they receive in exchange fail to
compensate them for the rights they have traded away. The conditions that
generate this phenomenon are: (1) a lack of communication among employees concerning their planned actions, (2) the presence of some concession
or threatened punishment designed to encourage the employee to sign the
contract provision, and (3) a perception on the part of each employee that
his vote is unlikely to be pivotal. In the presence of these conditions, a
type of strategic coercion may occur: each employee, fearing that a
majority of employees will waive their rights, waives his rights in order to
receive whatever meager compensation the employer offers or to avoid the
employer's retaliatory actions.75
This is not the end of the story, however. It may be possible for
employees to communicate among themselves and to organize in order to
defeat a yellow dog provision. If all of the employees hate the provision,
the best response is for all of them to agree never to sign such a provision.
Because these agreements are always possible, there is no reason to believe
that the sort of strategic coercion observed in the examples discussed above
will always occur. Indeed, the examples suggest that the primary function
served by a union organizer may be to prevent such outcomes from
occurring.
Some other types of contract modifications share features of the yellow
dog but also seem to deal with individual entitlements. Consider a contract
proposal in which the employee agrees to have his personal effects
searched every day by the employer, presumably for items stolen from the
worksite. If all of the other employees sign such a provision, the value of
refusing becomes worthless to the remaining employee. Any report of a

75. This type of coercion could not occur if unanimity were required for acceptance of the
employer's contract modification. In the case of a yellow dog, however, acceptance is achieved for
the employer's purposes when 50% of the employees agree to the provision.
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stolen item would immediately lead the employer to suspect the employee
who refused to sign a waiver. Alternatively, consider a contract in which
the employee agrees never to speak in favor of unionization at the
worksite. Because the value of discussing the benefits of organization is
to a large extent dependent on the freedom of other employees to also
discuss such matters, individual waivers will be influenced by the decisions
of other employees. Where individual rights decline in value as coworkers
trade them away, the kind of strategic coercion observed in the preceding
examples is possible.76
V.

Implications for Labor Law

A central aim of this Paper is to develop a theory that makes sense of
modern labor law minimum terms. I turn to that task now. First, I use
the theory to explain the effects of the yellow dog contract and its influence
on the development of labor law. Second, I use the arguments to provide
a positive theory of labor law minimum terms.
A.

The Yellow Dog Contract:Its Effects, the Casefor Prohibition,and Its
Influence on Labor Law

In spite of its importance to the development of labor law, there are
few historical accounts of the effects of the yellow dog contract. The best
available is Joel Seidman's,77 which I rely on below.
1. Effects of the Yellow Dog.-According to Seidman, the yellow dog
contract made its appearance in this country on a large scale during the
1870s, and the contract was used by an increasing number of employers
over the 1880s. Over the 1890s the contract continued to spread, but
declined in influence, as employees "no longer felt themselves morally
78
bound" to honor it.
Viewed in strictly economic terms, employees never had strong incentives to comply with the agreement. The employer had little incentive to
sue an individual employee for breach of the yellow dog agreement.7 9
The cost of suit would be substantial and the likely award trivial." Even
if the employer could show a substantial injury, most employees would
have been judgment proof with respect to the employer's damages."' The

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

For further development, see Hylton, supra note 68, at 8-10.
SEIDMAN, supra note 69.
Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 79; Witte, supra note 3, at 22.
SEIDMAN, supra note 69, at 79.
Id.
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more important hurdle, however, was proof of damages. 2 The employer
could not mount a strong claim for damages in the case of a single
employee who had violated a yellow dog agreement. The employer's loss
would be small and largely speculative. Further, if the employer sought
injunctive relief he could not expect success, for no court would have
required the employee to quit a union and remain in the service of the
employer. The employer's only practical retaliatory response to the breach
of a yellow dog contract was to dismiss the offending employee. But under
the at-will rule, the employer could have dismissed the employee for
joining a union even if there had been no yellow dog agreement. Thus, the
agreement itself was irrelevant insofar as it affected the economic
incentives of an individual employee.'
Because the employer seldom if ever brought suit against an individual
employee, the yellow dog was used largely for its "psychological effect"
on employees,' and as a threat against unions. But the unions generally
disregarded the contracts during the 1890s.1
The influence of the yellow dog was enhanced dramatically by the
Supreme Court's decision in Hitchman Coal & Coke v. Mitchell,' which
held that an employer could enjoin union organization efforts on the theory
that it was a tortious interference with the yellow dog agreements signed
by the employees.'
Several lower courts issued injunctions against
entirely peaceful organization efforts on the basis of Hitchman.88
The strategic considerations introduced in this Paper provide some
insight into the workings of the yellow dog and the desirability of the
Supreme Court's Hitchman decision. Seidman's historical account-which
suggests that the yellow dog was effective initially and then declined in
influence until the Hitchman decision-is consistent with a story in which
unions, over time, developed strategies that enabled them to neutralize the

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. After signing the contract, some employees apparently found it hard to break their word
by joining a union, even though the likelihood of retaliation by the employer was small. Id.
85. Id. at 18.
86. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
87. Id. at 259- 60.
88. See, e.g., Charleston Dry Dock & Mach. Co. v. O'Rourke, 274 F. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1921)
(granting an injunction to a business against certain union activities including interfering with the business's employees for the purposes of inducing them to stop performing their work); Vonnegut Mach.
Co. v. Toledo Mach. & Tool Co., 263 F. 192 (N.D. Ohio 1920) (granting an injunction to a business
against union picketing based on the Hitchman ruling against interference with employment contracts);
see also Osmond K. Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctionsand Yellow Dog Contracts,
30 ILL. L. REV. 854, 870 n.94 (1936) (listing cases which banned all peaceful picketing within a state);
Witte, supra note 3, at 24-25 (noting that the majority of cases since Hitchman have broadly applied
Hitchman's holding and have issued injunctions prohibiting all picketing based upon yellow dog

contracts).
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effects of the yellow dog. The obvious counterstrategy for the union is to
advise employees to sign the yellow dog, and then to violate it with
impunity. Such a strategy would be consistent with data suggesting a
simultaneous increase in the number of contracts and decline in their
influence.
My argument suggests that by the middle of the 1890s, yellow dog
contracts probably had little influence where union organizers could reach
workers. If the union organizer arrived before the employer presented the
yellow dog, he could persuade employees not to sign, or he could persuade
them to sign and violate it. In either case the organizer's primary role
would be as a coordinator of the employees' actions. The sort of strategic
coercion demonstrated in the preceding analysis of this Paper would be
much less likely to occur in the presence of a union organizer. Indeed, if
I am right in suggesting that the yellow dog was largely neutralized as a
result of the unions' counterstrategies by the early 1890s, it follows that it
may have had a beneficial impact over the middle and late 1890s. The
agreement may have served largely as a sorting device in the labor market,
enabling those employers and employees who preferred union shops to find
and select each other.
2. Case for Prohibitionof the Yellow Dog.-In light of this analysis
it is interesting that the yellow dog contract has received so much
criticism. 9 The real source of the "evil," to the extent that there was
any, was the Supreme Court's decision in Hitchman, not the contract. The
Hitchman decision transformed the yellow dog from a largely unenforceable promise to a powerful weapon against organization.
Both the analysis of this Paper and the historical account suggest that
the yellow dog, when matched against the unions' counterstrategies, had

89. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER& GREENE, supra note 4, at212 (claiming that inequitable conditions
surround the formation of yellow dog contracts and that the obligations under them are unfairly divided); SEiDMAN, supra note 69, at 34, 34-36 (detailing "reaction against the yellow dog contract" by

legislators and the general public, leading to efforts to enact prohibitions of the contract); Epstein,
supra note 5, at 1370 (reporting criticisms of yellow dog contracts by labor scholars).
The following passage conveys the extent to which the yellow dog had become, by 1930, the

central focus of pro-union legislative pressure groups:
The reaction against the contract culminated in the spring of 1930 in the rejection by the

Senate of the nomination of Judge Parker to the United States Supreme Court. Up to that
time, indeed, the yellow dog contract had figured little in the daily press, and the general
public was as yet largely unacquainted with the term. The storm of protest that swept

over the country when the author of [an opinion enforcing the contract] was named to the
highest judicial body in the land showed public opinion almost unanimously opposed to
the yellow dog contract. Senator after senator attacked Parker for having enforced the
contract, and ... [w]hen the Senate ... finally voted to reject Parker, it was in reality

passing judgment, not upon him, but upon the yellow dog contract.
SETMAN, supra note 69, at 36.
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ambiguous welfare implications. Under certain conditions, it would be
easy for the employer to induce employees to sign, even though they had
not received concessions that compensated them for the value of the rights
traded away. The employees, however, could prevent this from happening
by communicating among themselves on organizational matters. In
addition, the evidence presented in the Seidman study suggests that the
contracts were not very effective as obstacles to union organization,
especially after the 1880s, when organizers and many employees were
familiar with their implications and the difficulty of enforcing them. Had
the Supreme Court refused to uphold the injunction issued in Hitchman, no
broad legislative movement to ban the yellow dog contract would have
occurred, and there probably would have been no broad movement to enact
federal laws protecting the right to organize unions.
So does this analysis suggest that Hitchman was wrong on economic
grounds, as Archibald Cox asserts? 9° If, as some of the evidence
suggests, the yellow dog contract had been neutralized by union
counterstrategies, then the Hitchman decision should be criticized on
economic grounds, though for reasons far different from those expressed
by Frankfurter and Greene, Cox, and other labor law scholars. The
Hitchman decision's primary economic effect was to raise the costs of
union organizing-probably to a prohibitive level in some areas. This, in
turn, made it almost impossible in some instances for the union organizer
to play the role of coordinator among the employees, and the strategic
coercion phenomenon became more likely.
One can argue that there should be some limits on the things union
organizers are permitted to do in the course of an organization drive, and
that the Hitchman decision merely prohibited unions from coercing
employees. 91 If union pickets threatened bodily harm to employees who
refused to join the union, then they clearly were guilty of committing a
tortious interference with the employees' anti-union promise. The problem
with Hitchman, however, was the implication that an injunction could be
used against peaceful organization efforts. Peaceful efforts to persuade
employees to join a union are no closer to tortious interference than is an
advertisement that asks a consumer to switch to another product,' and the
90. Cox attacks the opinion on the ground that the Court took away the employees' only effective
form of self-help, but did nothing to solve the underlying economic problems-successive wage cuts
and high rents in the company's villages. ARCHIBALD COX, LAW AND NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 7

(1960).
91. For a recent argument suggesting that union organization efforts are often coercive, see
Epstein, supra note 5, at 1377.
92. See Francis B. Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REV. 663, 699-701 (1923)

(dismissing any enticement arguments as applicable to employees at will and arguing that there can be
no tort remedy when there are no contract rights to be protected). For the opposite position, see
Epstein, supranote 5, at 1373-74. Epstein argues that union efforts to persuade employees to breach
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mere risk of intimidation through threats of physical harm does not justify
a prohibition of peaceful efforts to persuade.
The foregoing suggests that the case for prohibiting the yellow dog
contract was weak before Hitchman, but became considerably stronger after
it. It was weak before Hitchman because there are good reasons, on
theoretical and empirical grounds, for concluding that the yellow dog
contract was ineffective as a deterrent to union organization after roughly
1890. The case for prohibition became strong after Hitchman because the
decision, as interpreted by some courts, made the contract too effective as
a deterrent. A better response would have been legislation targeted directly
at overruling Hitchman, or for Congress to simply do nothing and wait for
the courts to narrow the holding in Hitchman to the point that it no longer
constrained peaceful organizational effortsY But it is too much to ask for
perfect decisions from Congress. The final outcome, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act followed by the Wagner Act, can surely be defended as second-best.
B.

Modem Labor Law Minimum Terms

The new law of minimum terms is embodied in several doctrines and
statutory provisions of federal labor law. The statutory provisions are
section 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA. 5 Section 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits federal courts
from issuing injunctions in labor disputes. Section 8(a)(3) declares it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization," ' which
is generally understood as prohibiting yellow dog contracts. 97
I now turn to several areas of labor law in which federal common-law
doctrine has supplied additional detailed minimum terms. My aim is to
provide a positive theory of these rules. The first general area, "direct
yellow dogs," includes several types of agreement indistinguishable from
the traditional yellow dog. The second general area, "indirect yellow

their yellow dog contracts are tortious under the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853),
because those efforts invade an important interest of the employer. But Lumley held that the inducement had to be "malicious," id. at 749, and that is not easy to say in the case of peaceful union organization efforts. Unless courts are of the opinion that union organization could serve no useful purpose,
or lead to no desirable outcome, a finding that such efforts are malicious could not easily be based on
the doctrine of Lumley.
93. For evidence that courts had started to narrow the holding in Hitchman, see Witte, supranote
3, at 24-28.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 1370 (observing that yellow dog contracts "are today
forbidden by explicit statutory command" in § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA).
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dogs," includes agreements similar in effect to, or sharing some important
feature of, the yellow dog.
1. Direct Yellow Dogs.

a. Solicitation by Employees.-One of the key employee entitlements under the National Labor Relations Act is the right to engage in prounion solicitation and distribution of literature on company property. The
entitlement was established in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB.

In Republic Aviation the employer dismissed four employees: one for
engaging in pro-union solicitation in violation of a rule prohibiting
solicitation of any type in the factories or offices, the other three for

wearing pro-union buttons." The Supreme Court, affirming the National
Labor Relations Board, held that the promulgation and enforcement of the

no-solicitation rule violated section 8(a)(1)" 0 and discriminated against
the discharged employee in violation of section 8(a)(3). 1° 1 The employer
also violated section 8(a)(1) by discharging- the button-wearing

employees.

2

In response to the employer's argument that the Board

should be required to prove that enforcement of the no-solicitation rule
actually interfered with the section 7 right to organize, the Court held that
the Board was authorized to balance section 7 rights of employees against
employer property rights, 3 and that the Board could rely on its own

judgment in finding that the interference with section 7 rights in a given
context could not be justified by the employer's property interests.' °4
Subsequent decisions have distinguished the right to engage in prounion solicitation on company property from the right to distribute prounion literature. In general, the right to solicit is somewhat broader than
98. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
99. Id. at 795.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994) prohibits interference by an employer with the organizational
rights of employees.

101. 324 U.S. at 805.
102. Id. at 802. In a footnote the Supreme Court quoted with approval the Board's holding with
respect to the wearing of buttons. Id. at 802 n.7. The Board had held that the "right of employees
to wear union insignia at work has long been recognized as a reasonable and legitimate form of union
activity, and the [employer's] curtailment of that right is clearly violative of the Act." Republic
Aviation, 51 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1188 (1943).
103. 324 U.S. at 799.
104. The Court stated,
An administrative agency with power after hearings to determine on the evidence in
adversary proceedings whether violations of statutory commands have occurred may infer
within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may
be based upon the facts proven. One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such
boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute made
by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject
which is entrusted to their administration.
Id. at 800.
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the right to distribute literature, because it is less likely to result in
interference with the production process or in littering on company
property."
One can think of four areas of concern: (1) working time,
working area, (2) working time, non-working area, (3) non-working time,
working area, and (4) non-working time, non-working area. In the first
category, the employees' rights are severely limited: the employer may
prohibit pro-union solicitation and distribution of literature on company
time in work areas."'° The second category is similarly restricted; the
Board has consistently held that "working time is for work. " °" In the
third, the employer may prohibit the distribution of union literature, while
the prohibition of pro-union solicitation must be justified by special
circumstances." 8 Finally, in the fourth category the employer is
generally prohibited from enforcing a broad no-distribution, no-solicitation
rule."° Special circumstances, however, may still justify prohibitions in
this category, such as in the case of a hotel lobby where employees are
prohibited from distribution and solicitation in the presence of
customers." 0
The justification for the holding in Republic Aviation can be based on
this Paper's analysis of yellow dog contracts, though the analysis is
somewhat more complicated in this setting. One could argue that a provision waiving the right to speak about union matters on company property
effectively binds all employees after a majority has signed the provision.
After all, what use is the right to speak on a certain subject if two of the
three employees you work around are prohibited from carrying on the
conversation? Under this view, the prohibition on speech is indistinguishable from the yellow dog contract: acceptance by a majority or
supermajority binds all employees. It then follows that a ban on solicitation could result from the sort of strategic coercion analyzed earlier in

105. See, e.g., JULIUS G. GErMAN & BERTRAND B. PROGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC
PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 40, 38-40 (1988) (explaining that the NLRB distinguishes between
oral solicitation, which can usually be prohibited during work time in working areas, and the

distribution of literature, which may be prohibited in working areas during non-work time as well
because "literature presents more of a legitimate problem in working areas").
106. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943).
107. E.g., Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 394, 394 (1983); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. at
843.
108. E.g., Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615,621 (1962). Two members of the Board
dissented in favor of allowing distribution of literature on non-working time, working area. Id. at 62531.
109. E.g., G.C. Murphy Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 370 (1968), enforced, 422 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.

1969).
110. See, e.g., id. at 370 (holding that a sign prohibiting solicitors was directed to the public, not
employees, and thus did not inhibit union solicitation); May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981
(1944) (allowing a prohibition at all times of union solicitation on the selling floor of a department store
in order not to disrupt business), enforced, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725 (1946).
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this paper"'-that is, because of strategic incentives, the employees may
have traded away their right of pro-union solicitation for a price that failed
to compensate them for its value.
Does it matter that in the case of the yellow dog, the waiver of
organizational rights is bargained for, while in this case, the employer
merely announces a prohibition as a condition of entry onto the employer's
premises? Under the theory presented here it should not, for otherwise the
employer could evade a prohibition on certain contractual provisions
merely by making them conditions attached to the license to remain on the
employer's premises. Further, the strategic coercion problem is a serious
concern under either scenario.I"
Of course, one might argue that a ban on speech is not quite the same
thing as a ban on organization. While a ban on organization pretty clearly
binds all employees once a majority has accepted it, a ban on speech will
not necessarily have the same effect. In other words, even if a majority of
employees waive their right to speak on union matters, the minority may
find that they can still communicate on unionization matters and that their
right to communicate among themselves is still valuable. Does this change
the result? Not in a substantial way. Even if the minority can carry on
effective communication among themselves, it cannot be doubted that the
value of their right to communicate has been diminished by the fact that a
majority of employees have waived their right to communicate. Speech is
different from certain other elements of the employment bargain because
its value is heavily dependent on the freedom of other employees to speak.
In this setting, strategic incentives can still operate in a way that generates
an inequitable trade."'
This analysis suggests that the doctrine of Republic Aviation (and
related rules) can be understood as shielding employees from inequitable,
or "strategically coercive," transfers of the right to organize or communicate about organizational matters.
The strategic coercion theory also provides a justification for the
Court's holding that the Board did not have to demonstrate that the
employer's ban actually interfered with the right to organize. The
employer argued that the Board should be required to demonstrate that
unusual conditions made solicitation away from the employer's premises
extremely difficult." 4 The essence of the employer's position was that

111. See supra subpart IV(A).
112. Why? If the employees try to offer a concession in order to change the condition, they will
run into the very same incentive problems that generate inequitable transfers in the contract-making
process.
113. This is fairly easy to show in the examples discussed earlier in the text. See supra Part IV.
For a formal demonstration, see Hylton, supra note 68, at 8-10.
114. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798-99 (1945).
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because the right to exclude an employee from its property was absolute,
it could also require, as a condition of employment, that the employee
accept a prohibition on pro-union solicitation. For the Board to strip the
employer of that property right would at least require, under the
employer's theory, some showing that the employer's exercise of its
property right actually interfered with rights that the Board was authorized
115
to protect.
The employer's argument, based on the greater-includes-lesser-power
theory that the right to exclude implies an unlimited power to enforce
conditions on entrance, had to be rejected. First, the very power the
employer claimed (to prohibit solicitation) was at issue in Republic
Aviation, so it would have been strange indeed for the Court to reject that
power and then set up procedural barriers protecting the employer's use of
it. Second, in addition to being difficult to prove, an actual interference
requirement fails entirely to come to grips with the strategic coercion
problem. The potential for strategic coercion exists independently of the
ban's tendency to "actually interfere" with organizational rights.
Even if it were not extremely difficult to solicit employees away from
the employer's premises, a ban on solicitation would be troubling for two
reasons. First, it undoubtedly restricts organizational rights by raising the
cost of an organizational drive. Second, because of the incentive problems
identified earlier," 6 the employer can purchase organizational rights at
a price that fails to fully compensate employees. The Court's rejection of
an actual interference test is therefore consistent with a view of Republic
Aviation as a prophylactic rule against inequitable transfers resulting from
strategic incentives.
In NLRB v. Magnavox Co."7 the Court extended its holding in
Republic Aviation to make it an unfair labor practice for the employer to
adopt an overly broad ban on workplace solicitation even if the bargaining
representative accepts the ban." 8 The general rule is that the right to
communicate on organizational matters cannot be waived by the employee's
bargaining representative." 9
Magnavox is consistent with the view that the aim of the law is to
prevent coercive transfers of organizational rights. After the union has
115. The employer's argument was based on the theory of procedural due process articulated in
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which generally requires examination of three factors: the

private interest affected, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and the state's interest. Here the state's
interest is in enforcing the § 7 rights of employees.

116. See supra subpart IV(A).
117. 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
118. See id. at 325 (holding that a collective bargaining representative cannot waive employees'
substantive rights to join or assist a labor organization).
119. See id. (noting that waivers are frequently upheld in the economic area, but are not upheld
to bar employees from striking against unfair labor practices).
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been-certified, its incentives are in many respects similar to those of an

employer who wishes to avoid union organization efforts. In the case of
an incumbent union, the fear is that the employees will lend their support
to a rival union.'
The bargaining representative could reduce the

probability of a rival union's organizational campaign by waiving certain
rights of employees, such as the right to communicate about organizational
issues on the employer's premises. In order to induce employees to
support such a waiver, the incumbent union could offer some side payment

to supporters or signal the possibility of retaliation against those who refuse
to go along. The situation is indistinguishable from that of an employer
who proposes a yellow dog contract.
b. Solicitation by Nonemployees.-The Republic Aviation and
Magnavox decisions can be justified as implications of the argument for

banning the yellow dog contract.

The case for permitting pro-union

solicitation by nonemployees on the employer's property, however, is more
difficult. The Court held in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.' that the

employer may "validly post his property against nonemployee distribution
of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available
channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its

message and if the employer's notice or order does not discriminate against
the union by allowing other distribution." " The Court's recent decision
in Lechmere made clear that the Board is not generally authorized to
balance section 7 rights against the employer's property rights in deciding

whether access to the employer's property should be granted to a nonemployee organizer." Such balancing is appropriate only where unusual

120. Of course, there are several hurdles that might stand in the way of a rival union. One is the
election year bar of § 9(c)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3), which prohibits the direction of
an election within one year after a board-conducted election. Another, and more important hurdle, is
the contract bar doctrine, which bars the filing of an election petition by a lawfully recognized union
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration, not exceeding three years.
See generally BERNARD D. MELTZER & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 352-56 (3d ed. 1985).
121. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
122. Id. at 112.
123. Babcock & Wilcox created confusion. After stating that the employer may "validly post his
property against nonemployee distribution," id., the Court, referring to the problem of balancing property rights and § 7 rights, said that "accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." Id.
The two statements generated confusion as to the proper standard governing the rights of
employees to hear the organizational message of nonemployees. The holding in Babcock & Wilcox suggested that the employer could generally prohibit nonemployees from engaging in pro-union solicitation
and distribution of union literature on company property. The Court's reference to balancing rights,
however, suggested that the Board and lower courts were authorized to balance § 7 rights against property, just as in the case of solicitation by employees. Before the Lechmere decision, the Board had settled on the following standard:
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conditions make communication away from the employer's worksite extremely difficult, as in the case of a remote mining or logging camp.124
The theory of this Paper fails to provide a justification for granting
nonemployee organizers access to an employer's property. The yellow dog
contract is a contract between the employer and its own employees. The
ban on access by nonemployee organizers is a rule that extends to
nonemployees. Nothing strategically coercive about the contracting process
gives rise to a rule banning solicitation and distribution by nonemployee
organizers because the employer clearly enjoys the right to exclude them
from his property. The right is so clearly a part of the employer's
entitlement, and conversely so clearly not a part of the employee's
entitlement, that little room remains for an analysis of strategically coercive
transfers.
In other words, there is no sense in talking about whether a ban on
nonemployee organizers can be viewed as a way for the employer to evade
the restriction on yellow dog contracts. The theory of this Paper starts by
asking whether the subject of the agreement is one that could be transferred
from employees in a strategically coercive bargain. But if the subject is
not originally within the set of employee entitlements, then it cannot be
part of such a bargain.
One potential justification for allowing access by nonemployee organizers to an employer's property is that the organizer could play a crucial
role in reducing the potential for strategic coercion. More generally, the
organizer could play a role in solving any coordination problem that might
lead to an outcome in which employees traded away their rights for inadequate compensation. But this argument cannot be limited to those instances
in which communication away from the employer's property is difficult.
This argument suggests that nonemployee organizers should always be
given access to the employer's property because it is almost always easier
for the nonemployee organizer to address the employees there than
anywhere else."'

[I]n all access cases our essential concern will be [1] the degree of impairment of the
Section 7 right if access should be denied, as it balances against [2] the degree of
impairment of the private property right if access should be granted. We view the

consideration of [3] the availability of reasonably effective alternative means as especially
significant in this balancing process.
Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1988).
124. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537-40 (1992); NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber

Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972). For a critique
of Lechmere, see Estlund, supra note 14.
125. The theory of this Paper is that in certain circumstances, particularly in the case of a yellow
dog proposal, the contract-making process is likely to fail as a mechanism for transferring an employee
entitlement in a manner that benefits all parties. But in the case of granting nonemployee organizers
access to the employer's property, we are outside the scope of employee entitlements.
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That the theory of this Paper, as I have stated it, fails to provide a
good justification for a rule granting access to nonemployees does not
imply a limitation on the theory's usefulness; just the opposite view seems
appropriate. In spite of the apparent invitation in Babcock & Wilcox to
apply a balancing test in this area, courts have been reluctant to grant
nonemployees access to the employer's property for organizational
purposes. More recent cases following Lechmere have taken a narrow
view of this right."2 For all practical purposes, the employer is free to
enforce a general ban on the distribution of literature by nonemployees on
company property.
Closely related to the issue of nonemployee access is the question
whether the employer can ban communication among employees that deals
with the employment relationship but is not central to the collective
bargaining process, the issue considered in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB.' 2 The
Court held that the rule of Republic Aviation applied to communication
"closely tied to vital concerns of the Act. " "
This is a sensible
extension, given that the strategic coercion concern is just as applicable to
this instance as to that considered in Republic Aviation.
2. Indirect Yellow Dogs.-To this point I have considered employer
contract proposals that are in many respects quite similar to the yellow dog
contracts of the pre-Norris-LaGuardia era. Contracts not superficially
similar to the yellow dog, however, may nevertheless have similar effects.
I consider the treatment of these contracts here.
a. Assertion of Individual Contracts as a Bar to Recognition and
the Opt-Out Problem Generally.-In J.L Case Co. v. NLRB 9 the
Supreme Court was confronted with an employer who claimed that because
of the existence of individual contracts with roughly seventy-five percent
of his employees, he had no duty to bargain with the union on matters that
would conflict with those contracts until they had expired. The Court held
it a violation of the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain in good faith and a
section 8(a)(1) interference with organizational rights for an employer to

126. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Scot, Inc., 39 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing the heavy
burden nonemployees must meet before being allowed access to employer property to picket over substandard wages); NLRB v. Windemuller Elec., Inc., 34 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
employees have no right to use their employer's personal property-hard hats-to communicate a union
message provided that they can use their own property for that purpose); Oakwood Hosp. v. NLRB,
983 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1993) (denying a nonemployee organizer access to employer's cafeteria); Sparks
Nugget, Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 991, 997-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying nonemployee picketers access
to employer's property for the purpose of communicating with customers).
127. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
128. Id. at 575.
129. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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assert individual contracts as a justification for refusing to bargain with a
certified union.130
The question of the relationship between an individual contract and the
collective bargaining agreement is an important one for this Paper; for if
individual contracts could be asserted as a justification for an employer's
refusal to bargain, then yellow dog contracts could be introduced by the
employer through an indirect route. The strategy of offering individual
contracts to employees could be used to the same effect as the yellow dog.
To illustrate, suppose the employer, aware that a union organization
drive may begin at any moment, offers each employee an individual contract for three years. The employer signals to employees that failure to
accept such a contract would increase the probability of dismissal in the
near future. What is the likely outcome? Each employee will reason as
follows: "If no one else signs the contract, then the union organization
drive will be successful whether or not I sign the contract; it follows that
my best move is to sign the contract. But if everyone follows my
reasoning, a majority of employees will sign the contract, killing the
organization drive. In that case, my best move is clearly to sign the
contract." The end result: employees overwhelmingly choose individual
contracts-and this even when all of the employees would prefer union
representation.
The general problem raised by J.L Case is the extent to which
individual employees should be free to opt out of the union regime by
contract. The Court's opinion suggested that the scope for such opting out
is severely limited. An individual contract
cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit to which the employee
otherwise would be entitled under the [collective bargaining]
agreement. The very purpose of providing by statute for the
collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements
of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining
3
power and serve the welfare of the group.1 '
The individual is, however, free to continue in compliance with an individual contract that is not inconsistent with a collective agreement or is not
part of an unfair labor practice.'32
The doctrine is troubling in its implication that a superstar-a Michael
Jordan, for example-could not opt out of the union regime even though
he knows that it is unlikely that he would be better off as a member of the
union than if left to fend for himself. Indeed, in the case of an athlete such

130. See id. at 337 ("Individual contracts ... may not be availed of to defeat or delay the
procedures described by the National Labor Relations Act looking to collective bargaining . ..

131. Id. at 338.
132. Id. at 339.
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as Michael Jordan, the players' union probably reduces his welfare,
because it allows less talented players to take advantage of the leverage the
union gains by having Michael Jordan as a member. This is hard to defend
because it suggests that the statute is designed to allow less talented or less
energetic workers to expropriate a portion of the wealth generated by the
more talented and energetic.
The potential for this kind of expropriation is unavoidable in any
regime in which unions are permitted to exist. However, the notion that
the law aims to facilitate expropriation is inconsistent with many of its
provisions. The doctrine incorporates limits on the extent to which the
wealth of the Michael Jordans of this world can be expropriated. In NLRB
v. American NationalInsurance Co.,"' the Court held that it is not a per
se violation of the duty to bargain in good faith for an employer to insist
on a contract provision that gives management full authority with respect
to certain mandatory bargaining topics."
Thus, American National
Insurance permits an employer to bargain for complete discretion over
wages, hours, and other terms of employment. In light of the employer's
power to seek such discretion through the bargaining process, the union
generally will have a hard time using the bargaining process as a means of
expropriating wealth from talented workers, for in those instances in which
much of the value of the employer's output is produced by a minority of
talented employees, the employer will have a strong incentive, and will
also be in a strong position, to argue for discretion to award compensation
according to individual productivity. 3 '
b. Permissive Bargaining.-A second example of the indirect
introduction of a provision having the effect of a yellow dog contract is the
employer's attempt to bargain about the identity of the bargaining
representative. The Court's decision in NLRB v. WoosterDivision of BorgWarner"6 suggests that the identity of the representative is a permissive
rather than mandatory subject of bargaining," 7 and subsequent Board

133. 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
134. Id. at 409.
135. There are other doctrines that seem to limit the scope for expropriation-I have not attempted
to survey them. For example, in resolving disputes over the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, the
Board looks for a mutuality of interests in wages, hours, and working conditions. See generally
GETMAN & POGREEIN, supra note 105, at 22-26 (discussing the process of determining which workers
can appropriately be grouped together in a bargaining unit).
136. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
137. The employer in Borg-Warner insisted on a provision that required the parties to recognize
as the employee's bargaining agent the local affiliate rather than the international union which had been
certified as the exclusive representative by the Board. Id. at 345. The Court stated that although this
clause was not related to a mandatory bargaining subject and thus could not be insisted upon, it was
nevertheless a lawful proposal. Id. at 349-50.
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decisions make it clear that the representative's identity is a permissive
topic."8 The employer may therefore propose the subject but cannot
condition his acceptance of mandatory terms on the union's agreement to
bargain on the recognition matter.1Y 9 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Harlan argued that the subject of recognition was determined by Board
procedures set forth in the statute, and that the employer's attempt to
condition signing the agreement on the substitution of a representative other
than that certified by the Board was a direct contravention of the

statute. 140
That recognition is permissive is consistent with the aim of preventing
strategically coercive transfers of organizational rights. Restrictions on
recognition bargaining are appropriate if the law is to prevent the indirect
introduction of yellow dog contracts into the bargaining process. To see
this, suppose the employer offers his favorite representative, the Union of
United Fumblers (UUF), as a substitute for the certified bargaining
representative. Suppose further that the employer deals directly with a
representative who always decides according to the wishes of a majority of
bargaining unit members. If the employer offers a side payment in
exchange for substituting the UUF for the current bargaining unit, the
situation would be equivalent to that of an employer bargaining directly
with employees over a yellow dog provision.
One might argue that the union bargaining situation is more complicated because the employer does not deal directly with employees-he deals
with a negotiating committee fielded by the union. But this does not make
the strategic coercion result less worrisome, nor does it suggest that there
will necessarily be a better outcome. The presence of a negotiating
committee introduces "agency costs" 14 1 --costs that result because union
decisionmakers may vote in a manner that is inconsistent with the preferences of the majority. The agency problem suggests that the bargaining
representative may turn down the yellow dog provision even when a majority of employees would have accepted it. It also suggests, however, that
the representative may accept the yellow dog when a majority would have
rejected it.
The more general question is whether the bargaining representative has
incentives to always vote in a manner that mirrors the preferences of a
majority of the rank and file. Although it seems desirable at first glance
that the representative have such a set of incentives, it is not necessarily so.

138. E.g., Simplicity Pattern Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1283 (1953).

139. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349-50.
140. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
141. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. ECoN. 305, 308-10 (1976) (discussing the

costs to the agent and the principal arising from the agency relationship).
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As an actor that helps parties overcome collective action problems, it is
preferable that the union, in some instances, not vote in a manner that
reflects the preferences of a majority. Indeed, if, as suggested in Part II
of this Paper, union organizers had adopted counterstrategies that neutralized the yellow dog contract, this was effective precisely because the
organizer did not simply accept the preferences of the majority, but sought
to change those preferences.
In light of the potentially conflicting roles played by the union
leadership, it is understandable that the law makes recognition permissive
rather than illegal. To make recognition bargaining illegal would prevent
the union from accepting a bargain on recognition under any
circumstances. Instead, the law merely prohibits the employer from
bargaining hard for a deal on recognition, making it more difficult for a
coercive transfer to take place.'42
The theory that explains the holding in Borg-Warner on recognition
bargaining can be extended to justify decisions making the size and
composition of the bargaining unit permissive topics. Just as the employer
could use recognition bargaining as a method of introducing a yellow dog,
bargaining over the size and composition of the bargaining unit could be
used to the same effect. The employer could propose to weaken the
bargaining unit by including a majority of employees whose interests are
opposed to those in the original bargaining unit. The union itself may seek
to expand the bargaining unit in a way that leads to the entrenchment of
officials, or enhances their power at the expense of the members."
c. Waivability by Bargaining Agent.-Closely related to the
preceding issues is the extent to which the bargaining agent may waive
certain rights of employees. Recall that the Court held in Magnavox that
the bargaining agent cannot waive the right of employees to communicate
with respect to organizational matters on the employer's premises. On the
other hand, American National Insurance authorizes the bargaining agent
to waive the union's bargaining authority with respect to wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. Is there some principle that explains this
dichotomy between the waivability of organizational and economic
interests?

142. Thus, Justice Harlan's suggestion that the recognition clause in Borg-Warnerwas an illegal
bargaining topic is not entirely consistent with the theory of this Paper.
143. I have argued elsewhere that this theory explains the Court's decision that retirees are not
"employees" within the meaning of the NLRA in Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). See Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Theory oftheDuty to Bargain,
83 GEo. LU. 19, 59-60 (1994) (warning that if the bargaining unit includes retirees, more powerful
current employees may bargain away the retirees' benefits for their own gain).
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The thesis urged here, that a bedrock principle of labor law is the
prevention of potentially coercive transfers of organizational rights,
explains the dichotomy. Professor Michael Harper has explored this
question in more detail, and has concluded that the dichotomy reflects a
basic policy of protecting "full freedom of association.""
This policy
reflects a basic attachment, in his view, to democratic institutions, reflected
in our constitution and political architecture. 45
The legitimacy of
democratic institutions is dependent on the ability of participants to vote in
a manner that expresses their preferences and to communicate among themselves in order to gain access to information that relates to the political
process. Hence, labor law rules were adopted that seek to maximize this
freedom for employees.
Professor Harper's theory works well in explaining the doctrine of
waivability, but its limits are exposed when one attempts to apply it to
Babcock & Wilcox. It follows from Professor Harper's theory that employees should have the right to hear information on the election process from
nonemployee organizers, and that in order to protect this right, the
employer should generally be required to allow those organizers onto his
property so that they can be heard by his employees. This is an important
source of information on the organization process; its availability would
enhance communication on organizational matters. In order to protect
employees' access to this source of information, the employer should be
required to allow nonemployee organizers onto his property so that their
message can be heard by his employees. All of this would seem to follow
from the theory that the statute aims to protect the legitimacy of the voting
process. For all practical purposes, however, the law denies nonemployee
organizers access to the employer's property.
The theory of this Paper is capable of reconciling the Babcock &
Wilcox/Lechmere and Republic Aviation/Magnavox doctrines. If the aim
of the law is simply to prevent strategically coercive transfers of
organizational interests, then surprisingly little work is needed in order to
reconcile the doctrines. The goal of preventing coercive transfers makes
the Republic Aviation doctrine necessary. On the other hand, as I have
argued above, there is no need for a rule that opens the employer's
property to nonemployee organizers. The NLRA seeks to prevent coercive
transfers of certain recognized property rights, but it does not alter the
common-law assignment of property rights. 46

144. Michael C. Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part 1, 4 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 335, 343-45 (1981) (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280, 279-80
(1956)).
145. Id. at 345-46.

146. See Hylton, supra note 143, at 43-45.
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VI. Conclusion
I have attempted to provide a theory of minimum terms in employment
contracts, with an emphasis on section 7 rights under the NLRA.
The claim that minimum terms are inconsistent with employment at
will is not valid because the at-will rule existed simultaneously with several
common-law minimum terms. Common-law minimum terms were based
largely on three theories: externality, mutuality, and incommensurability.
Courts refused to enforce agreements that were socially harmful, such as
price-fixing cartels, were based on opportunistic bargains, or required a
party to surrender something as important and irreplaceable as liberty.
The New Deal introduced as a new minimum term the freedom to
form and join unions. Since then, courts have refused to enforce antiunion promises. The justification for prohibiting anti-union promises is not
an easy one, and would be considerably weaker if not for the Supreme
Court's decision in Hitchman. Because of strategic incentives generated by
the bargaining process, however, an anti-union promise may not in all
cases be a device that enhances the wealth of employees. The new minimum term protecting organizational rights can be justified as a way of
shielding employees from potentially harmful results generated by their
own strategic bargaining incentives. If we assume this is the aim of section
7 doctrine, it becomes much easier to understand and reconcile fundamental
labor law decisions on the scope of section 7.

